The GoldBod 'Loss' Debate: Dickson Assan Puts the Financial Numbers in Perspective

My aim is to provide an accountant's objective comprehensive analysis of the performance of Ghana Gold Board - GoldBod for the purposes of public education. My responsibility as an accountant is to follow the numbers, understand the accounting treatment behind them, and separate the facts as documented from the propaganda and politics.

Is the GoldBod a loss-making entity? The data proves that the entity is NOT a loss-making entity for the 2025 financial year.

Let me explain:

The company's total revenue was GHS5.55 billion cedis. This included a GHS4.55 billion grant from the government to be used to purchase the gold.

You're asking, but why did they include that as part of their revenue? That's a correct accounting treatment under IPSAS 23 – Revenue from Non-Exchange Transactions.

Its total expenditure for the same period was GHS109.6 million. When you deduct this from the revenue, it shows a profit (surplus) of GHS5.44 billion.

Even if we take out the grant from the government, Goldbod would still have made a profit of GHS896.3 million. This is about 5x more than the restated 2024 surplus of GHS178.48 million made by then PMMC. This represents an increase of about 402%.

I must, however, state that the grant was disclosed by GoldBod itself as a revolving trade-capital subvention for gold purchasing and trading. When we go to their balance sheet, that amount is sitting there as unspent cash.

So while it is legitimately revenue under IPSAS, it is a one-off capital injection, not recurring income, and hence the GHS896.3 million ex-grant figure shows a true and fair view of the performance of GoldBod.

Now because IPSAS recognizes the full grant as revenue in the year it was received, I don't expect to see it as revenue in 2026 unless the government has pumped in extra monies.

Assuming GoldBod's 2026 revenue and surplus fall below the 2025 figures, that should not automatically be read as a decline in performance. It would largely be the base effect of a one-off capital injection not recurring. Hence, the ex-grant, like-for-like comparison will again be the fairer basis for judging how the entity actually performed.

Did total expenditure decline by 15.5%, as has been argued by the CEO of GoldBod?

On the surface of the accounts, yes. Total expenditure fell 15.5% from GHS129.7 million in 2024 to GHS109.6 million in 2025. The entire decline is explained by the absence of finance cost in 2025. In 2024, finance cost was GHS46.04 million. In fact, if you strip finance cost out of both years and compare the genuine operating cost lines, actual operating costs rose from GH¢83.6 million in 2024 to GH¢109.6 million in 2025, representing an increase of about 31%.

Is this concerning? No! That is reasonable and explainable considering the sizable increase in operations compared to the then PMMC. For example, employee strengths increased by 4x from 114 to 450.

The narrative that total expenditure fell by 15.5% is technically correct, but it doesn't show a true reflection of what happened.

Now, where is the loss-making narrative coming from?

First, it must be emphasized that GoldBod does not itself buy and trade gold on its own balance sheet under the Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) programme. It acts as the Bank of Ghana's buying agent for artisanal and small-scale (ASM) gold, earning a fee for doing so. The actual gold trading position, and the risk that comes with it, sits with the Bank of Ghana, not GoldBod.

The Bank of Ghana's own audited accounts show a real loss on that trading activity. There is a net loss on gold deals (G4R + G4O programmes) to a tune of GHS9.05 billion in 2025 compared with GHS5.66 billion in 2024.

Of this loss, GH¢8.85 billion relates specifically to the G4R program, where GoldBod is the buying agent for ASM gold

This loss is flagged by the IMF's fifth review under the arrangement under the extended credit facility, requests for modification of and monetary policy consultation clause and program extension, and financing assurances review report (December 2025).

The IMF cited losses of US$214 million on the ASM gold component of G4R through just the third quarter of 2025. They therefore recommended that these losses "should not be borne by the central bank" but should be "transparently brought on budget."

When the loss is netted against the gain of GHS of GHS9.57 billion from the sale of refined and bullion gold in 2025, BoG's overall gold-related position for the year was close to break-even, not a straightforward loss story.

Is this GoldBod's loss? Technically, no!

The loss is recognised in the Bank of Ghana's financial statements under the G4R programme, not in GoldBod's statement of financial performance. The IMF itself discusses these losses as costs associated with the domestic gold-purchase arrangements and argues that losses from the programme and GoldBod-related activities should not ultimately be borne by the central bank but should be transparently brought onto the budget.

However, we should also not go to the other extreme and say GoldBod has absolutely nothing to do with the losses. GoldBod operates within the architecture of the program, and some program costs can arise from fees and the arrangements through which the gold is purchased and supplied. The IMF specifically identified trading losses and costs associated with the ASM doré transactions.

In many ways, it is still too early to make a firm judgement on whether GoldBod is ultimately creating value for Ghanaians or imposing a cost on the public purse. GoldBod only became operational in April 2025, and its Board was inaugurated in May 2025. So the 2025 accounts cover only a partial first year and still contain transitional figures inherited from PMMC.

And this matters because efficiency is rarely achieved fully in the first year of a new institution. Over time, however, we should expect to see the benefits of learning, scale, better systems, stronger controls, technology, and process improvements reflected in the numbers.

That is why 2025 cannot yet give us the full picture of GoldBod’s true operating performance, cost structure, sustainability and its relationship with the gains and losses arising from the wider gold-purchasing programme.

The more meaningful test will come after GoldBod completes its first full financial year in 2026. So whether one is already celebrating GoldBod as a major success or condemning it as a loss-making venture, I think both conclusions are premature at this stage.

Going forward, Ghanaians need a clear and transparent reconciliation between GoldBod, the Bank of Ghana, and the wider gold-purchasing programme.

This becomes even more important now that GoldBod has secured an agreement to acquire 30% of Ghana’s large-scale gold production to support the country’s strategic reserves under the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GANRAP).

As the volume and value of gold passing through GoldBod increase, the public should be able to trace the full financial flow from purchase to final disposal.

I suggest the reconciliation clearly shows:

1. how much gold was purchased;

2. the purchase price;

3. how the purchases were financed;

4. fees and other costs incurred;

5. gains or losses recorded by GoldBod;

6. gains or losses recorded by the Bank of Ghana; and

7. what portion, if any, ultimately becomes a fiscal cost to Government.

Without this reconciliation, one institution may report a surplus while losses connected to the same programme appear elsewhere in the public accounts.

The key question should therefore be: after all purchases, financing costs, fees, valuation movements and sales are accounted for, what is the net benefit or cost to Ghana?

That is the level of transparency and accountability we should demand as GoldBod’s role in Ghana’s gold sector expands.

Writer: Dickson Assan, CA

Chartered Accountant | SME & Financial Management Advisor.